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Abstract 
Trusts have long been associated with elaborate tax avoidance schemes, primarily as a result of their 
flow-through nature. In the National Budget the Minister of Finance indicated that the government 
was proposing several legislative measures during 2013/2014 regarding trusts to control abuse. At 
this stage the proposals are vague and confusing, but it is intimated that the conduit pipe principle 
may be under review as the proposals state that trusts should no longer act as a flow-through 
vehicle, meaning that the amounts distributed to the beneficiaries will no longer retain their original 
identity. The main objective of the research was to clarify the proposed changes to the taxation of 
trusts, to investigate the potential impact(s) of these proposals (albeit unclear and consequently 
based on certain assumptions), and to assess whether discretionary trusts still have a future in South 
Africa given these proposals. In order to meet this objective, a qualitative approach based on a 
literature study of pure theoretical aspects was used. It was found that should the proposals become 
law the beneficiaries will be worse off. 
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1. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
During the 2013 budget speech, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan indicated that the government 
was proposing several legislative measures during 2013/2014 regarding the taxation of trusts, 
which have ‘long been a problem for global tax enforcement due to their flexibility and flow-
through nature’ (BDO, 2013). Treasury also intends to review the estate duty planning 
functionality of trusts as it indicated its concern regarding the use of trusts to avoid estate duty 
(Croome, 2013). It was however indicated that the proposals would not apply to special trusts 
catering for the needs of minor children and disabled persons (Croome, 2013). 
Treasury is seeking additional sources of income due to the shortfalls in revenue collections. It 
therefore proposes to ‘tighten up on revenue collections’ by adopting measures which include, 
among others, ‘the curtailing tax avoidance associated with trusts and the taxation of trusts’ 
(Caroll, 2013). Trusts have long been associated with elaborate tax avoidance schemes, and the 
perception exists that trusts are misused by wealthy South Africans or so-called ‘high net worth 
individuals’ (BDO, 2013). Therefore it was expected that the government would take extreme 
measures proposing that trusts would be liable to pay tax in their own right without the 
possibility of passing income and capital gains through to beneficiaries (Croome, 2013). 
On 14 June 2013 representatives of the National Treasury and the Commissioner of the South 
African Revenue Service (‘SARS’) together with representatives of the Fiduciary Institute of 
Southern Africa, Financial Planning Institute, Law Society of South Africa, South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, South African Institute of Tax Practitioners and the Society 
of Trust and Estate Practitioners, held a meeting to discuss the future of the taxation of trusts. 
Feedback from the meeting led Paulsen and Botha (2013) to believe that National Treasury 
seems to have a lack of understanding of the operation of trusts, and little consideration has 
been given to the serious consequences of imposing the trust reform proposals. National 
Treasury therefore seeks to understand the current position of trusts and the relevant tax 
consequences. 
It was expected that the trust reform proposals would be included in the 2013 draft Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill and Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill (issued during July 2013), as 
the draft legislation usually gives effect to tax proposals announced during the Budget Review. 
The draft legislation, however, did not include any trust reform information or specifics, which 
has resulted in National Treasury indicating that the trust reform proposals require more 
consultation and will be dealt with later in 2013 or as part of 2014’s process (National Treasury, 
2013).  
The problem that arises from all of the abovementioned developments, processes and 
statements issued by National Treasury is that they confuse taxpayers, tax practitioners and the 
general public alike as to what exactly the proposals are and what the future of trusts in South 
Africa is. The proposals are vague and confusing (Caroll, 2013), and the only reference to trust 
reform in the 2013 Budget speech document is the following: ‘The taxation of trusts will come 
under review to control abuse’ (Gordhan, 2013:21). These reforms might have a significant 
impact on tax planning and structuring, estate planning and the existence of trusts. According 
to Haupt (2013:778) a discretionary trust is currently preferred for estate planning purposes, as 
the assets in the trust do not form part of the estate of the beneficiary and so cannot be subject 
to estate duty in his hands. The trustees would then give the beneficiary only income and capital 
for his needs. The impact of the proposed amendments might significantly change this school of 
thought, as it seems at this stage that the amendments are to apply to discretionary trusts 
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(Seccombe, 2013:37). The article therefore aims to clarify the proposed changes to the taxation 
of trusts, investigates the potential impact(s) of these proposals (albeit unclear and 
consequently based on certain assumptions), and assesses whether discretionary trusts still 
have a future in South Africa given these proposals.  
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The article primarily investigates the question whether discretionary trusts have a future in 
South Africa. Firstly, the investigation aims to clarify what exactly the taxation of trusts reforms 
is and secondly what the potential impact of these proposals could be. The impacts are based on 
the assumptions applied in the clarification process found in section 6 of the article. In 
summary, the potential problems associated with the taxation of trusts reforms are highlighted 
and the result of the investigation could assist tax practitioners and taxpayers in effective tax 
and estate planning. Relevant issues for future consideration are therefore identified to 
potentially assist the taxpayer in deciding whether a discretionary trust is appropriate for his or 
her objectives and needs.  
The article makes use of a qualitative approach based on a literature study of pure theoretical 
aspects. A documentary analysis is used as the research method. Hutchinson and Duncan 
(2012:101) describe the research strategy followed (which is doctrinal in nature) as research 
which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, 
analyses the relationships between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts 
future developments.  
The problem-based doctrinal research methodology applied in this article includes the following 
steps (Hutchinson & Duncan, 2012:106): 
 Gathering of all relevant and applicable facts; 
 Identification of the specific requirements; 
 Analysis of the issues from a legislative perspective; 
 Studying of sources such as academic text books, journal articles as background; 
 The identification of primary sources including case law and legislation; 
 Synthesising of all the relevant issues within the correct context; and 
 The drawing of an effective and sensible conclusion. 
To achieve the abovementioned objectives the article makes use of the following structure: 
 A discussion of the reasons for and costs of establishing a trust; 
 A concise discussion on the current income tax treatment of trusts in South Africa; 
 Clarification of the taxation of trusts amendment proposals; 
 Practical examples of the potential implications of the proposed taxation on trusts 
amendments; 
 An international perspective on the taxation of trusts, specifically with regard to the tax 
treatment of trusts in Australia; 
 Summary, conclusion and recommendations. 
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3. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
This article focuses exclusively on the potential impacts of the proposed amendments in respect 
of a discretionary trust. Furthermore, consideration is given only to ordinary trusts. Special 
trusts are therefore excluded from the scope of this article. For purposes of the discussion on the 
international treatment of trusts, relevant legislation and the practice of Australia are 
specifically used. Reasons for the selection of Australia as a source for this comparative study 
are provided under section 7 of this article. It is also stated that the outcome of the article is 
based upon certain key assumptions that are discussed under section 6. 
4. THE REASONS FOR AND COSTS OF ESTABLISHING A TRUST 
It is important to understand the reasons for establishing a trust as well as the costs associated 
with the establishment and management thereof, before one can investigate the potential 
impacts of the proposed amendments. This is deemed important, as the taxpayer will have to 
consider the costs versus the benefits of establishing and making use of a trust. 
4.1 Reasons individuals make use of trusts 
According to Hill (2012) trusts are commonly used to ‘freeze’ the value of assets where a natural 
person does not want the assets to form part of his deceased estate. The transferor will usually 
sell his assets to the trust, and any further growth in the value of the assets will accrue to the 
trust. The effect is to reduce the dutiable estate of the seller over time and effectively the 
estate duty arising upon his death as well. Estate duty is often called a wealth tax, and trusts 
could therefore assist in the reduction of wealth taxes as well as executors’ fees. This ultimately 
results in the heirs receiving a larger inheritance (Hill, 2012). Another reason for accumulating 
assets in a trust is the deceased’s potential liability for capital gains tax. For capital gains tax 
purposes a deceased person is deemed to have disposed of his assets to his deceased estate for 
proceeds equal to their market value at the date of his death (Stiglingh, Koekemoer, Van 
Schalkwyk, Wilcocks & De Swardt, 2013:996). Hill (2012) states that there are seven main 
reasons for establishing a trust: 
1. Trusts offer protection against other types of tax – should the deeming provisions in section 
7 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (‘Act’) not apply, tax savings might be available. For 
example, income can be distributed to trust beneficiaries who might fall under a lower tax 
bracket than the original owner of the assets. Capital gains can also be distributed to such 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, if the trustees do not wish that beneficiaries use the cash 
immediately (for various reasons), income and gains can be vested in such beneficiaries and 
physical payment made later, for example, at a time when they reach an age of 
understanding, or the monies are needed to fund education; 
2. Trusts can reduce the costs of winding up a deceased estate – executor’s fees and other 
winding-up costs can reduce the available cash balance in an estate. Trusts do not die and 
would therefore not incur such costs; 
3. Trusts offer protection against the uncertainties of life – trusts offer protection against 
claims arising against a personal owner of assets during his lifetime. At death, 
compensation in the form of life assurance proceeds is usually available, but, during life, a 
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large claim against one’s estate, possibly leading to personal sequestration, results in no 
assurance compensation. A trust is consequently a useful risk management tool; 
4. Trusts offer protection against the uncertainties of death – trustees who are skilled in 
financial planning and wealth management can materially enhance the long-term financial 
well-being of current and future generations; 
5. Trusts can buy time – the winding-up process of an estate can be a lengthy process of six to 
eight months or even longer. During this time, a business owned personally by the deceased, 
or a company of which he was the sole director, is at risk. In such circumstances, normal 
commercial decision-making is suspended, which can lead to customer shrinkage and a 
potential drop in the value of business assets. Should the deceased’s business have been 
placed in a trust beforehand, no such time constraints are applicable. Hill (2012) also 
argues that it makes more sense to reduce one’s personal assets and liabilities to 
manageable portions, while building up trust assets which the trustees can continue to 
manage after a person’s death, unconstrained by legislated timetables; 
6. Trusts can mitigate or avoid the common shortfalls in cash in a deceased estate – most 
estates require the executor to sell assets to generate sufficient funds to discharge debt. 
The timing of the sale is not a luxury available to the executor, and so, quite often, valuable 
assets realise far less on a forced sale than they would under normal circumstances. This 
means that even more assets have to be sold (again at lower prices) to make up for any 
shortfalls; 
7. Trusts permit ‘one owner, many users’ – management, registration, accounting, expense and 
financial records can be centralised, thus saving costs, while trust beneficiaries can enjoy 
the advantages of ownership on an equitable basis.  
Finally, the conduit pipe principle applied to trusts offer a further advantage with regard to 
potential tax savings. In Armstrong v CIR [1938] 10 SATC 1 (‘Armstrong’) it was determined that 
the income of a trust retains its identity until it reaches the parties (beneficiaries) in whose 
hands it is taxable. A trust is therefore a mere conduit pipe through which the income flows. This 
means that if income accrues to a trust and the trustees distribute it to one or more 
beneficiaries in the same year, the income retains its nature in the hands of the beneficiary 
(Holdstock, 2013). For example, if a trust receives interest, dividends or a capital gain and 
distributes these to a beneficiary, the amounts retain their identity and the beneficiary will 
receive interest, dividends or a capital gain respectively (Seccombe, 2013:36). When a trust 
distributes income or capital out of a trust, the amounts will no longer be subject to tax in the 
trust, but will be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary (Seccombe, 2013:36). The trust law 
therefore provides for income-splitting opportunities (Holdstock, 2013) – this is the main 
reason why trusts can be used efficiently for tax purposes. 
Based on the conduit or flow-through principle when the accrual of the income is to a 
beneficiary, any exemption from tax provided in the Act applying to the income will be available 
to that beneficiary. For example, if the beneficiary receives local dividends as a distribution 
from the trust the section 10(1)(k) exemption will be available to the beneficiary. If the 
beneficiary receives interest as a distribution from the trust, the beneficiary will be entitled to 
the section 10(1)(i) exemption (Stiglingh et al., 2013:807).  
If a beneficiary receives a distribution of capital gain the income will not be treated as ordinary 
income but will retain its identity as a capital gain. The Eighth Schedule to the Act provides 
specifically for this application. Paragraph 80(2) is applicable when a beneficiary acquires a 
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vested interest in a capital gain (as a result of the trustees exercising their discretion to 
distribute the gain) made by the trust on the disposal of an asset. Paragraph 80(2) states that 
in this scenario the capital gain vesting in the beneficiary must be disregarded in the trust but 
taxed in the hands of the beneficiary in whose hands the gain vests. The capital gain will be 
included at the inclusion rate of 33.3% in the beneficiaries’ taxable income after deducting the 
annual capital gains tax exclusion of R30 000. Natural persons can therefore benefit from the 
tax exemptions related to the income derived from a specific asset class, while housing the said 
assets in a trust. 
4.2 Costs related to the establishment and management of a trust 
The cost for the establishment of a trust is currently in the vicinity of R4 500 (including VAT and 
master’s fee) (Rall-Willemse, 2013). A trustee is not automatically entitled to compensation, 
but trustees are often lawyers or other professionals who cannot afford to work for nothing. 
Therefore, a trust deed usually makes provision that trustees are entitled to reasonable 
payment for their work (Sebenza, 2013). Trustees’ fees could therefore vary from trust to trust. 
Before 23 February 2011, a substantial difference existed between the amount of transfer duty 
levied on the acquisition of a property by a natural person and by a trust. A natural person was 
taxed on a sliding scale ranging from 0%-8% of the property purchase price, while a trust was 
taxed at a fixed rate of 8% of the property purchase price. After 23 February 2011, however, 
companies and parties other than natural persons (including a trust) have been taxed on the 
same sliding scale (ranging from 0%-8%) as natural persons (SARS, 2013). Depending on the 
nature and extent of the activities of the trust, additional costs such as administration or 
management fees, accounting fees and legal fees might also be incurred. Finally, a trust (other 
than a special trust) is taxed at a flat rate of 40%, and its inclusion rate for purposes of capital 
gains tax is 66.6%. 
5. CURRENT INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF TRUSTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As stated in the scope and limitations section of this article, the income tax treatment of 
special trusts are not considered for the purposes of this article. The article therefore focuses on 
an ordinary trust that, by default, is a trust that is not a special trust as defined. Special trusts 
are taxed at the rates applicable to individuals. The tax rate for an ordinary trust is fixed at 40% 
(Stiglingh et al., 2013:805). According to Haupt (2013:777) there are two types of ordinary 
trusts, namely a testamentary trust (this is a trust created in terms of a will) and an inter vivos 
trust (this is a trust created by contract during the lifetime of the creator). In each of these 
trusts there are two types of rights a beneficiary can have: 
 a vested right – which means that either the income or the capital of the trust must be paid 
to the particular beneficiary. The trustees are therefore merely administering the capital or 
income for the beneficiary; or 
 a contingent right – which means that no particular beneficiary is entitled to any income or 
capital unless the trustees decide to make a distribution to the beneficiary. In this case 
there is a chance that the beneficiary will never receive any portion of the income or capital 
in the trust (Haupt, 2013:777). 
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In the aforementioned instance, the trustees are administering the capital and income for the 
beneficiaries as a group with no certainty as to which beneficiaries will ultimately benefit from 
the funds in the trust, and to what extent (Haupt, 2013:778). 
A trust is not regarded as a natural person and does not qualify for the primary, secondary or 
tertiary rebate (Stiglingh et al., 2013:805). A trust also does not qualify for the annual capital 
gains tax exclusion (currently R30 000 for the 2014 year of assessment) available to a natural 
person (Seccombe, 2013:36). In addition, the trust will not qualify for the general exemption in 
respect of local interest in terms of section 10(1)(i) (currently R23 800 for taxpayers under 65 
and R34 000 for taxpayers 65 and over for the 2014 year of assessment), as this exemption is 
available only to natural persons (Stiglingh et al., 2013:805; Seccombe, 2013:9). 
As a taxpayer in its own right a trust pays tax at a flat rate of 40% of taxable income – 
representing the highest rate of tax (Seccombe, 2013:9, 36). A trust is also taxed at the highest 
rate for capital gains purposes. With effect from 1 March 2012 an inclusion rate of 66.6% is 
applied to a net capital gain of a trust, causing a taxable capital gain in the trust, which will be 
subject to tax at 40%, resulting in an effective rate of capital gains tax of 26.6%. As of 
1 April 2012 a resident trust receiving local dividends from a South African company investment 
will be subject to a 15% dividend tax, and once the dividend tax has been withheld the trust 
receives a local dividend exempt from normal tax in terms of section 10(1)(k)(i) (Seccombe, 
2013:9). Section 10(1)(k)(i)(ee) has been created with effect from 1 April 2012 as an anti-
avoidance provision to eliminate tax avoidance by means of a cession of the dividend stream 
(Seccombe, 2013:9). This specific exception to the general rule, whereby local dividends will 
remain taxable, deals with two main scenarios, namely dividends received by or accrued to a 
company in consequence of any cession of the right to that dividend or the exercise of a 
discretionary power by any trustee of a trust, unless that cession or exercise is part of the 
disposal of all rights attaching to the share (SAICA, 2013:2). 
In summary, a trust will be taxed on receipts and accruals which have not vested in any 
beneficiary during the year of assessment in which they were so accrued or received by the trust. 
This result is achieved by section 25B of the Act. In essence, section 25B provides that (subject 
to section 7) the income of the trust is taxed either in the trust or in the hands of the 
beneficiaries (Haupt, 2013:796). It effectively means that, should dividends, interest and/or 
capital gains accrue to a trust during any year of assessment, and none of those amounts vest in 
any beneficiary, the trust cannot make use of any of the concessions available to a natural 
person in respect of those amounts. Section 7(1) applies where the beneficiary has a vested 
right to the income retained in the trust. In other words, the beneficiary is certain to get the 
income at some time in the future; his enjoyment of it has merely been postponed. If he dies 
before the income is paid to him, it will go to his estate. Therefore, as the income is effectively 
the beneficiary’s, he will be taxed on it (Haupt, 2013:803). 
With regard to a discretionary trust, section 25B(2) states that the exercise of the trustees’ 
discretion qualifies as a vesting event. Williams (2009:577) states that the decision in the case 
SIR v SIR v Rosen [1971] 32 SATC 249 (‘Rosen’) held that a trust deed may entitle or oblige 
trustees to administer the trust income in such a way that the trust is not a mere conduit for 
passing it on to the beneficiary and suggested that, in this event, income of the trust may lose 
its character as ‘income’. It is argued that this applies specifically to discretionary trusts, as the 
trustees can decide whether or not to distribute any amounts to the beneficiaries and are thus 
not merely a ‘flow-through’ mechanism. The judge in Rosen raised, but left open, the question 
whether trust income would change its character to capital where the trustee did not distribute 
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such income and accumulated it in the trust. According to Williams (2009:577) the later 
decisions in Estate Dempers v SIR [1977] 39 SATC 95 (‘Estate Dempers’) and SIR v Sidley [1977] 
39 SATC 153 (‘Sidley’) suggest that, if income is accumulated in this way, trust income retains its 
character as ‘income’ but left open the question whether it would retain its character as such if 
it was distributed in a later year of assessment. Should a discretionary trust receive dividends 
and or interest during a year of assessment, and the trustees decide not to distribute these 
amounts to beneficiaries, the decisions in Estate Dempers and Sidley imply that those amounts 
remain dividends and interest in the trust’s hands. If, however, the trustees exercise their 
discretion in the same year of assessment in which the amounts are received or accrued, the 
amounts vest in the beneficiaries and based on the conduit pipe principle retain their nature in 
the hands of the beneficiaries. 
6. CLARIFICATION OF THE TAXATION OF TRUSTS AMENDMENT PROPOSALS 
Although it is not clear at this stage what exactly is intended, it is intimated that the conduit 
pipe principle may be under review, as the proposals state that trusts should no longer act as a 
flow-through vehicle, meaning that the amounts distributed to the beneficiaries will no longer 
retain their original identity (BDO, 2013) and that a trust should be taxed as a separate and 
distinct entity (Croome, 2013). The proposals suggest that taxable income/losses and capital 
gains/losses will be taxed in the trust, with distributions acting as deductible payments to the 
extent that there is current taxable income (Caroll, 2013). Where distributions are deductible 
payments for the trust, the beneficiary would then be taxed thereon as having received ordinary 
income (the effect of the income not retaining its original identity) (BDO, 2013). This 
interpretation of the proposed amendments is similar to the one supported by Seccombe 
(2013:36) (as discussed in the next paragraph). It is important to note that these proposals are 
not intended to affect special trusts (Caroll, 2013).  
Seccombe’s (2013:36) suggestion as to what the proposal encompasses is that if the application 
of the conduit pipe principle is scrapped it will imply that discretionary trusts will only be able to 
distribute ‘taxable income’. Therefore, if the trustees of a discretionary trust exercise their 
discretion to distribute amounts to beneficiaries in the same year of assessment in which the 
amounts are received or accrued, a normal income tax calculation for the trust needs to be 
done. The result of this calculation should be the theoretical taxable income of the trust if no 
distributions were to be made and none of the receipts and accruals vested in any beneficiaries 
during that same year of assessment. The term ‘taxable income’ is defined in section 1 of the Act 
as: 
the aggregate of the amount remaining after deducting from the income of any person all the 
amounts allowed…to be deducted from or set off against such income; and all amounts to be 
included or deemed to be included in the taxable income of any person in terms of this Act.  
The taxable income of a trust must therefore be calculated by including all receipts and accruals 
(certain of these receipts and accruals may be exempt from tax, for example local dividends), 
claiming certain expenses as deductions and including any taxable capital gain (66.6% of the 
net capital gain). After calculating the taxable income of the trust, the trustee can make 
distributions to the beneficiaries. Once the amount of taxable income has been distributed out 
of the trust, the amount will be subject to tax in the hands of the beneficiary and not in the 
trust. Any distributions to beneficiaries would therefore be treated as a deductible payment by 
the trust (BDO, 2013).  
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A further contention is that the receipts and accruals are taxed at entity level (Croome, 2013) in 
the trust’s hands irrespective of whether the trustees exercise their discretion or not. This 
contention ignores any vesting of amounts in the beneficiaries. Once the trust is taxed in its own 
capacity, distributions to beneficiaries are treated as after-tax distributions and non-taxable 
in their hands. This treatment is similar to the treatment of dividends distributed to a beneficial 
owner by a company. The company is taxed on its taxable income, with dividends distributed to 
beneficial owners which are exempt from normal tax in their hands. The onus of the tax liability 
in this case falls on the trust, as opposed to Caroll and Seccombe’s contention that the tax 
liability will lie with the beneficiary. 
With the abovementioned interpretations taken into consideration, the following key 
assumptions are made for purposes of this article: 
Interpretation 1 
 The proposed amendments will apply to discretionary trusts only. 
 If amounts accrue to (or are received by) a discretionary trust during a year of assessment 
and the trust makes distributions to beneficiaries in that same year of assessment, those 
amounts are deemed to be income in nature (irrespective of its original nature) in the 
hands of the beneficiary. From this it follows that the taxable income of the beneficiary 
resulting from the distribution is calculated as if it is the taxable income of the trust.  
 If none of a discretionary trust’s receipts and accruals vest in any beneficiary during the 
year of assessment, the trust will be taxed on those amounts. 
 The amount of the distribution that is taxable in the beneficiaries’ hands is determined by 
calculating the trust’s taxable income. Only that portion of the distribution which equals 
the taxable income of the trust is included as taxable income in the beneficiaries’ hands. 
 The article focuses purely on the income tax treatment of the distribution and does not 
take into consideration the actual cash flow to the beneficiaries. 
Interpretation 2 
 The proposed amendments will apply to discretionary trusts only. 
 If amounts accrue to (or are received by) a discretionary trust during a year of assessment, 
those receipts and accruals are taxed at entity level in the trust’s hands irrespective of 
whether the trustees exercise their discretion or not. 
The following section makes use of practical examples illustrating the probable implications of 
both interpretations of the proposed amendments. The current income tax treatment and the 
proposed income tax treatment for different scenarios are investigated and compared. Tax 
rates, concessions and exemption thresholds applicable to the 2014 year of assessment are used 
for the purpose of the examples. 
6.1 Practical examples of the probable implications of the proposed 
amendments 
To illustrate the practical impact of the proposed amendments the following scenarios should be 
considered: 
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Scenario 1 – Current income tax treatment of discretionary trusts where the trustees exercise 
their discretion 
ABC Trust is a discretionary trust. The trust has one beneficiary, who is a natural person, under 
the age of 65 and a South African resident. The trust received the following amounts during the 
2014 year of assessment: 
 Proceeds from the disposal of a capital asset   R1,5 million 
 Interest received from South African investments  R50 000 
 Dividends received from South African investments (gross) R50 000 
Assume that the capital asset is not an allowance asset and that its base cost is R500 000. 
TABLE 1 illustrates the income tax calculation of the trust and the beneficiary if the trustees of 
the trust decide to distribute all of the receipts and accruals in the trust to the beneficiary 
during the 2014 year of assessment: 
Table 1: Current income tax treatment – all receipts and accruals vest in beneficiary 
Income tax treatment of the discretionary trust Amount (R) 
Taxable income - 
The ABC Trust has no taxable income, as all receipts and accruals vest in the beneficiary in the same 
year of assessment in which those amounts were received by or accrued to the trust. The exercising of 
the trustees’ discretion is a vesting event.  
Income tax treatment of the beneficiary Amount (R) 
Gross income 100 000 
Dividends 50 000 
Interest  50 000 
Less: Exemptions 73 800 
Basic interest exemption (section 10(1)(i)) 23 800 
Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k)) 50 000 
Income 26 200 
Add: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)¹ 323 010 
Taxable income² 349 210 
Normal income tax³ 80 234 
Less: Primary rebate 12 080 
Normal tax payable to SARS 68 154 
All receipts and accruals of the ABC Trust vest in the beneficiary in terms of section 25B(2) and are therefore 
taxable in the beneficiary’s hands. The conduit pipe principle ensures that the receipts and accruals retain their 
original nature in the hands of the beneficiary. The beneficiary is therefore entitled to the basic interest 
exemption, dividend exemption, and annual exclusion of R30 000 for capital gains tax purposes as well as the 
primary rebate of R12 080. 
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1. ([R1 500 000 – R500 000] – R30 000) x 33,3% = R323 010 
2. Assume that the beneficiary had no other receipts and accruals for the 2014 year of assessment. 
3. R53 096 + 30% x (R349 210 – R258 750) = R80 234 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The overall effect is that an amount of R68 154 is payable to SARS. The following scenario 
illustrates the income tax effect where the trustees do not exercise their discretion with regard 
to distributions to the beneficiary. 
Scenario 2 – Current income tax treatment of discretionary trusts where the trustees do not 
exercise their discretion 
Assume the same information as in Scenario 1, except that the trustees do not exercise their 
discretion during the 2014 year of assessment with regard to distributions to the beneficiary. 
TABLE 2 illustrates the current income tax consequences of the instance where the trustees do 
not exercise their discretion during the 2014 year of assessment. The amounts received by the 
ABC Trust are therefore retained in the trust and none of it vests in the beneficiary.  
Table 2: Current income tax treatment – no amounts vest in beneficiary 
Income tax treatment of the discretionary trust Amount (R) 
Gross income 100 000 
Dividends 50 000 
Interest  50 000 
Less: Exemptions 50 000 
Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k)) 50 000 
Income 50 000 
Add: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)¹ 666 000 
Taxable income 716 000 
Normal income tax² 286 400 
Normal tax payable to SARS 286 400 
None of the receipts and accruals of the ABC Trust vest in the beneficiary in terms of section 25B(2) and are 
therefore taxable in the trust’s hands. The trust is entitled only to the dividend exemption, as it is not a natural 
person and therefore does not qualify for the basic interest exemption, the annual exclusion of R30 000 for 
capital gains tax purposes or the primary rebate of R12 080. There are no income tax consequences for the 
beneficiary, as no receipts or accruals vest in his hands.  
1. [R1 500 000 – R500 000] x 66,6% = R666 000 
2. R716 000 x 40% = R286 400 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The overall effect is that an amount of R286 400 is payable to SARS. The same result will be 
achieved where the contention that the trust must be taxed at entity level is followed (refer to 
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Scenario 5). The following scenario illustrates the income tax effect of both interpretations of 
the proposed amendments. 
6.1.1 Interpretation 1 
Scenario 3 – Proposed income tax treatment of discretionary trusts where the trustees exercise 
their discretion 
Assume the same information as in Scenario 1, except that the income tax treatment is dealt 
with in accordance with the proposed amendments discussed earlier and that the trustees 
exercise their discretion during the 2014 year of assessment with regard to distributions to the 
beneficiary. Table 3 illustrates the proposed income tax consequences for the ABC Trust of the 
instance where the trustees exercise their discretion during the 2014 year of assessment.  
TABLE 3: Proposed income tax treatment of the trust – all receipts and accruals vest in  
beneficiary 
Income tax treatment of the discretionary trust Amount (R) 
Gross income 100 000 
Dividends 50 000 
Interest  50 000 
Less: Exemptions 50 000 
Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k)) 50 000 
Income 50 000 
Add: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)¹ 666 000 
Taxable income² 716 000 
Deduct: Distribution to beneficiary of taxable income³ 716 000 
Taxable income - 
The trust is entitled only to the dividend exemption, as it is not a natural person and therefore does not qualify 
for the basic interest exemption, the annual exclusion of R30 000 for capital gains tax purposes or the primary 
rebate of R12 080. There are no income tax consequences for the trust, as the distribution of taxable income is 
deemed to be a deduction for purposes of the calculation of the trust’s taxable income. The amount of the 
taxable income distributed to the beneficiary is taxable in the beneficiary’s hands as taxable income. The 
conduit pipe principle is not applied and the distribution loses its original nature consisting of a combination of 
capital and exempt income receipts and accruals.  
1. [R1 500 000 – R500 000] x 66,6% = R666 000 
2. The taxable income of the trust represents the amount of the distribution that can be made to the 
beneficiary which would qualify as a deduction in the trust’s hands. 
3. Under the new proposed amendments, the distribution of taxable income of the trust to a beneficiary 
will qualify as a deduction against the trust’s taxable income. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
TABLE 4 illustrates the income tax effect of the proposed amendments of Scenario 3 for the 
beneficiary.  
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TABLE 4: Proposed income tax treatment of the beneficiary – all receipts and accruals vest in  
beneficiary 
Income tax treatment of the beneficiary Amount (R) 
Taxable income received from discretionary trust 716 000 
Taxable income¹ 716 000 
Normal tax² 216 165 
Less: Primary rebate 12 080 
Normal tax payable to SARS 204 085 
There are no income tax consequences for the trust, as the distribution of taxable income is deemed to be a 
deduction for purposes of the calculation of the trust’s taxable income. The amount of the taxable income 
distributed to the beneficiary is taxable in the beneficiary’s hands as taxable income. The conduit pipe principle 
is not applied, and the distribution loses its original character, consisting of a combination of capital and 
exempt income receipts and accruals. The beneficiary therefore does not qualify for the basic interest 
exemption, annual exclusion of R30 000 or the inclusion rate of 33.3% of net capital gains for purposes of capital 
gains tax.  
1. Assume that the beneficiary had no other receipts and accruals for the 2014 year of assessment. 
2. R185 205 + 40% x (R716 000 – R638 600) = R216 165 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The overall effect is that an amount of R204 085 is payable to SARS. In terms of the current 
income tax treatment of this scenario, a total amount of R68 154 (refer to calculation in 
TABLE 2) would have been payable to SARS. The result is an alarming increase of almost 200% in 
the overall income tax liability caused by the exercising of the trustees’ discretion. The proposed 
amendments directly disqualify the beneficiary from making use of both the basic interest 
exemption and the capital gains tax concessions available to a natural person. From the 
calculations performed in the tables above it can be clearly seen what drastic negative effect 
the proposed amendments have on the taxation of the relevant receipts and accruals. In 
conclusion, these proposals will have a significant impact on the taxation of trusts and trust 
beneficiaries (Deloitte, 2013:23). If these proposals should become law, the beneficiaries will be 
worse off from a financial perspective and this could ultimately lead to the end of discretionary 
trusts. The negative and adverse income tax consequences could therefore nullify any other 
non-income tax advantages, such as the protection of assets and effective wealth management 
on behalf of the beneficiaries. It seems, however, that non-discretionary trusts are unaffected 
by the proposed amendments and that distributions made to beneficiaries from those trusts will 
retain their original character and be treated as such from an income tax perspective. 
Scenario 4 – Proposed income tax treatment of discretionary trusts where the trustees do not 
exercise their discretion 
The income tax consequences where the trustees do not exercise their discretion and retain all 
receipts and accruals in the trust are exactly the same as in Scenario 2 under the proposed 
amendments.  
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6.1.2 Interpretation 2 
Scenario 5 – Proposed income tax treatment of discretionary trusts if the trust is taxed at entity 
level 
The trust would in this instance be taxed on the receipts and accruals in the 2014 year of 
assessment irrespective of whether those amounts vest in the beneficiary. The income tax 
consequences of this scenario are exactly the same as in Scenario 2. The beneficiary would then 
receive the distribution tax free from the trust, as the amount would already have been subject 
to normal income tax in the trust.  
The following section investigates the income tax treatment of discretionary trusts from an 
international perspective (specifically that of Australia). This is done to obtain an 
understanding of how discretionary trusts are treated outside of South Africa and to possibly 
identify certain principles or practices that could lead to a more effective, efficient, equitable 
and reasonable income tax treatment of discretionary trusts and its beneficiaries. 
7. THE TAXATION OF TRUSTS FROM AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
7.1 Motivation for using Australia for purposes of comparison  
According to Haupt (2013:5), South African income tax legislation originated from the 
Australian New South Wales Act of 1895, and is therefore similar in a number of respects. In CIR v 
Manganese Metal Co (Pty) Ltd [1996] 58 SATC1 it was also stated that the South African income 
tax structure is comparable to that of Australia’s. In addition, Australia is described as a ‘first 
world country’ and is also a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (‘OECD’), which are trendsetters with regard to the establishment of uniform 
economic standards and the application of prudent, sensible economic practice in the fields of 
economics, taxation and accounting (OECD Member Countries, [s.a.]). An investigation into the 
treatment of discretionary trusts for Australian income tax purposes is therefore deemed 
insightful and could possibly lead to identifying useful principles that can be successfully 
applied within a South African income tax context. For the purpose of this article, the relevant 
Australian income tax legislation to be investigated is the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(‘ITAA36’). 
7.2 Introduction and background 
For Australian income tax purposes a trust is an intermediary between individuals and 
underlying business or investment assets. The ultimate aim of the rules governing the taxation of 
income derived through a trust is to tax individual beneficiaries. The rules therefore trace 
income through the trust, or, where the trust is subject to separate taxation, through imposition 
of tax liability on the trustee, and ultimately reconcile the tax imposed at the trustee and 
beneficiary level (Woellner, Barkoczy, Murphy, Evans & Pinto, 2013:781). 
A discretionary trust is one of five types of trusts used in Australia. The trustee of a discretionary 
trust has the discretion to decide how the income and/or capital is distributed between the 
beneficiaries. This may enable the trustee to distribute the trust income in such a way as to 
minimise the overall tax liability on the total trust income or on the total income of the 
beneficiaries (Woellner et al., 2013:785). The taxation of trust income is governed by Section 95-
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102 of Division 6 (Part III) of the ITAA36. Section 97 of the ITAA36 determines the extent to which 
beneficiaries are taxed on trust distributions. For the purposes of section 97, a beneficiary's 
proportionate entitlement to a share of the ‘income of a trust’ is established by the trustee and 
then that share is applied to the net income (taxable income in accordance with section 95) in 
order to ascertain the amount of taxable income of the beneficiary (Timms, 2010).  
7.3 Current income tax treatment of receipts and accruals of a 
discretionary trust 
Beneficiaries are taxed on a share of the trust’s net income, based on their present entitlement 
to a share of the income of the trust estate. Trustees are taxed (as representatives of the trust) 
on the net income that is not taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries. Capital gains and other 
amounts can be streamed to beneficiaries. These amounts retain their tax character when taxed 
in the hands of the beneficiaries (Australian Treasury, 2012:9). 
With regard to capital gains and capital losses, unless there is a beneficiary with absolute 
entitlement to the asset, a capital gain or capital loss realised on a trust asset is generally 
included in the trust's net capital gain or net capital loss calculation for the year. If the trust 
deed specifically provides for a beneficiary’s entitlement to capital gains, these gains can be 
allocated to the beneficiaries for tax purposes. If no beneficiary is specifically entitled to a 
capital gain, it is allocated proportionately to all beneficiaries based on their entitlement to 
income of the trust (Australian Government, 2013). Capital gains would then be included in a 
beneficiary's taxable income respectively under the specific capital gains tax provisions 
(Australian Government, 2013). These distributions therefore retain their original nature and are 
taxed as such in the beneficiaries’ hands.  
If no beneficiary is entitled to the trust's income, the trustee will accumulate the trust's income 
and the trustee is liable for tax (on behalf of the trust) on the trust's net income. A trust is 
generally assessed at the highest individual marginal rate of tax (Australian Government, 2013), 
which is 45% for the 2013/2014 year of assessment (Power, 2013). It is argued that entitlement 
and vesting carry the same meaning and have the same effect for income tax purposes. Both of 
these events indicate that the income tax consequences of the receipt or accrual lie with the 
beneficiary once it has taken place. TABLE 5 indicates, among other things, the current income 
tax treatment of receipts and accruals of a discretionary trust in Australia. From the table it can 
be seen that Australia’s current income tax treatment of discretionary trusts is materially 
similar to that of South Africa’s as it seems to apply the same fundamental principle of receipts 
and accruals retaining their original character or nature. It can therefore be argued that 
Australia also makes use of the conduit pipe principle and it can further be inferred from the 
Australian proposals summarised in Table 5 that the conduit pipe principle is still deemed 
relevant and applicable. 
7.4 Entity taxation proposal 
On 13 August 1998 the Australian Government announced its intention to adopt a more 
consistent regime for the taxation of entities by developing a single entity tax regime (Woellner, 
Barkoczy, Murphy & Evans, 2004:1050, 1060). The single entity tax regime proposed to tax 
discretionary trusts like companies. Under this regime discretionary trusts will be taxed at entity 
level and impute the tax paid to the beneficiaries of the trust. Discretionary trust distributions 
in the form of payments of money, the transfer of property or certain other specified 
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transactions that are comparable to deemed dividends would be subject to entity taxation. The 
trustee would be liable for tax on any income not distributed and there would be no other tax 
consequences for the after-tax profits retained in the trust (Woellner et al., 2004:1060-1061). 
Distributions to beneficiaries would be treated as coming from profits (to the extent of the 
trust’s available profits), and when available profits are exhausted, distributions would be 
treated as coming from contributed capital (Woellner et al., 2004:1061). It is argued that this 
proposal is the same as the one presented under Interpretation 2, where it was assumed that the 
trust is taxed on all receipts and accruals irrespective of whether they vested in the beneficiary 
of the trust, or not. The result is that the onus of the tax liability is on the trust, with the 
beneficiary receiving a non-taxable distribution. The distribution would have been subject to 
normal income tax in the trust’s hands.  
In October 2000 the Australian Government released exposure draft legislation providing for the 
taxation of trusts like companies (Atherton, 2013), and the new entity tax regime was to 
commence on 1 July 2001 (Woellner et al., 2004:1050). Following the release of the exposure 
draft legislation, the government received a great number of submissions which raised technical 
problems particularly in relation to distinguishing the source of different distributions, and 
valuation and compliance issues that meant that the draft legislation was not workable. The 
Taxation Institute of Australia (‘TIA’) raised the following concerns relating to the provisions in 
the exposure draft legislation in a letter to the Australian Treasurer. The TIA stated that the 
provisions are incomplete; add substantial complexity to the tax law; impose massive 
compliance burdens; are inequitable; impose double tax; and are unworkable due to the inability 
of the drafters to determine key definitions. The Australian Board of Taxation was of the view 
that the efficiency and equity of the tax system would not necessarily be improved by aligning 
the tax treatment of trusts and companies. The Board also noted that any proposal to tax 
discretionary trusts like companies could impose significant transitional costs on the economy 
and on those individuals who have structured their affairs under existing rules. The Australian 
government heeded advice from the Board of Taxation, which recommended that the Bill should 
not proceed and suggested investigating alternative approaches (Atherton, 2013). The 
Australian government announced on 27 February 2001 that it would not proceed with proposals 
in the draft New Business Tax System (Entity Taxation) Bill 2000. Instead, the government 
proposed consultations on ways to address tax abuse in the trust area (Woellner et al., 
2004:1050).  
7.5 Reform of the taxation of trust income (update and rewrite of 
existing provisions) 
In December 2009, Australia’s Future Tax System Review recommended that the rules relating to 
the taxation of trusts be updated and rewritten to reduce complexity and uncertainty around 
their application (Australian Treasury, 2012:7). An initial consultation paper (Modernising the 
taxation of trust income — options for reform), which outlined three possible models for taxing 
trust income, was released by the Australian government in November 2011. The Australian 
government also highlighted that the reform options would not include taxing trusts like 
companies.  
Based on stakeholder consultation forums and written submissions on the Modernising the 
taxation of trust income — options for reform (Australian Treasury, 2012) the Australian 
Treasury released a Policy Options Paper in October 2012 outlining two potential options for 
trust tax reform. The Australian government has not yet announced its preferred option. The 
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proposed new regime is intended to commence from 1 July 2014 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2013). 
The two models developed are the economic benefits model (‘EBM’) and the proportionate 
assessment model (‘PAM’). The EBM uses tax concepts to determine amounts for tax purposes, 
while the PAM uses general concepts of profit to determine tax outcomes. Both models still 
require compliance with the trust deed and trust law, but move away from relying on the trust 
deed’s labelling of amounts as income or capital to determine tax outcomes (Australian 
Treasury, 2012:8). TABLE 5 illustrates the difference between the current law and the two 
models. 
TABLE 5:  Comparison of current law with two proposed new models 
 
Current law 
Economic benefits 
model 
Proportionate 
assessment model 
Basis for taxation Beneficiaries are taxed on 
a share of the trust’s net 
income, based on their 
present entitlement to a 
share of the income of the 
trust estate. Trustees are 
taxed on the net income 
that is not taxed in the 
hands of the beneficiaries.  
Beneficiaries are taxed on 
amounts distributed or 
allocated to them that 
represent amounts of the 
trust’s taxable income. 
The trust’s taxable income 
is calculated as if the 
trust were a resident 
taxpayer (Australian 
Treasury, 2012:16). 
Trustees are taxed on 
amounts representing 
taxable income that are 
not distributed or 
allocated to beneficiaries.  
Beneficiaries are taxed on a 
share of the trust’s taxable 
income based on their 
present entitlement to a 
share of the trust profit or 
class amounts. Trustees are 
taxed on taxable income 
that is not taxed in the 
hands of the beneficiaries.  
Character retention 
and streaming 
Capital gains (among 
other amounts) can be 
streamed to beneficiaries. 
These amounts retain their 
tax character when taxed 
in the hands of the 
beneficiaries.  
Amounts representing the 
trust’s taxable income 
retain their tax character 
when distributed or 
allocated to beneficiaries 
(except where other parts 
of the tax law limit 
character retention). All 
amounts can be streamed 
to beneficiaries.  
Classes of taxable income 
taxed in the hands of the 
beneficiaries retain their 
tax character (except where 
other parts of the tax law 
limit character retention).  
All amounts can be 
streamed to beneficiaries.  
Source: Australian Treasury, 2012:9 
In summary, from the table above it can be seen that Australia still makes use of a principle 
similar to that of the conduit pipe principle as it is currently used in South Africa, and through 
consultation and various review processes abandoned the concept of taxing a trust at entity 
level in the same manner as a company. It is therefore argued that if a first world country and 
leader in economic guidelines and principles, such as Australia, still makes use of the conduit 
pipe principle and applies trust taxation legislation effectively and efficiently, it would be 
cumbersome and ineffective for South Africa not to follow the same route. It is submitted that 
current legislation regarding the taxation of discretionary trusts in South Africa is adequate, 
and that a more effective application of current anti-avoidance rules and mechanisms by SARS 
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would discourage taxpayers from abusing trusts. To punish discretionary trusts in the manner 
proposed therefore seems heavy-handed and unnecessary given the current legislation and 
structures available to the revenue authority at present. 
8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the trust reform proposals are vague, the article clarified the proposed changes to the 
taxation of trusts. Two possible interpretations can be derived from the literature review, 
namely:  
1. The scrapping of the conduit pipe principle, meaning that the amounts distributed to the 
beneficiaries will no longer retain their original identity and those amounts will be income in 
nature in the hands of the beneficiary. The beneficiary therefore does not qualify for the 
basic interest exemption, annual exclusion of R30 000 or the inclusion rate of 33.3% of net 
capital gains for purposes of capital gains tax. Any distributions to beneficiaries would be 
treated as a deductible payment by the trust to the extent that there is current taxable 
income. 
2. A trust should be taxed as a separate and distinct entity, meaning that trusts would be liable 
to pay tax in their own right without the possibility of passing income and capital gains 
through to beneficiaries. Therefore, irrespective of whether the trustees exercise their 
discretion or not, amounts received by the trust will be taxed in the trust’s hands and 
distributions made to beneficiaries would be tax-free in their hands. 
The use of a discretionary trust might become extremely unfavourable should the radical 
proposed amendments be applied. It is important to note that a trust cannot simply be 
terminated owing to a change in tax legislation. The Trust Property Control Act makes no 
provision for deregistration of a trust (Grobbelaar, 2013). The common law, however, makes 
provision for the termination of a trust by operation of law. A trust can be terminated only in the 
following circumstances – by statute, fulfilment of the objectives of the trust, failure of the 
beneficiary, renunciation or repudiation by the beneficiary, destruction of the trust property, or 
the operation of a resolutive condition (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
2013). Therefore before terminating a trust the trustees must ensure that the termination is in 
line with the termination requirements and the conditions relating to termination contained in 
the trust deed (Lester, 2013). If the trust deed does not contain any termination specifics or 
requirements, the trust deed needs to be altered (Fouche Attorneys, 2013). This may require the 
consent of all the trustees and/or the beneficiaries. The trustees must also act in the 
beneficiaries’ best interests, which are not necessarily the best interests of the donor/settlor.  
In view of the new tax proposals it might make good sense to terminate a trust and to return the 
trust assets to the donor/settlor, but this might not be in the best interests of a beneficiary 
(Lester, 2013). It is important to note that the termination of a trust will have capital gains tax 
implications. In most instances the termination of a trust will constitute a ‘disposal’ of all the 
assets of the trust for capital gains tax purposes, causing capital gains tax to be charged on all 
capital appreciation within the trust. The disposal value will be determined at current market 
value (Lester, 2013). 
Legislation has changed over the years to protect the tax base against tax avoidance from the 
use of discretionary trusts (Alexander Forbes, 2013). According to Seccombe (2013) National 
Treasury’s proposed amendments are unnecessary, as the Act already contains efficient and 
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suitable anti-avoidance measures such as section 7 and the general anti-avoidance rules 
contained in sections 80A to 80L (commonly known as the ‘GAAR’). In essence, section 7 of the 
Act is an anti-avoidance provision aimed at taxing, in the hands of the donor, any income which 
has resulted from a donation or similar disposition. It is important to note that the provisions of 
section 7 are not concerned with who formed or created the trust but rather with the person who 
transferred assets into the trust. Section 7 effectively seeks to tax the person who introduced 
the assets into the trust on the income generated by those assets (Haupt, 2013:797). 
Furthermore, section 10(2)(b) of the Act negates the conduit pipe principle in relation to income 
which is exempt under section 10(1)(h) and (k) where the trust receives dividend income and 
distributes it in the form of an annuity (Williams, 2009:577). Despite the fact that section 25B 
makes a trust a legal person and not a mere conduit, the section implicitly seems to leave intact 
the conduit pipe principle except in situations, such as those mentioned above, where it is 
statutorily negated, and this was confirmed in the SARS Practice Note 23 (Williams, 2009:577): 
Income of the trust which is not distributed to beneficiaries but is accumulated in the trust 
and ‘capitalised’, retains its character as income. 
Practice Note 23, however, has been withdrawn by SARS, but does in any case offer some insight 
into their interpretation of the abovementioned issue.  
Should the proposed amendments be enacted into South African income tax legislation it might 
be necessary to expand the special inclusions paragraphs with regard to the gross income 
definition in section 1 of the Act to make provision for an taxable income item (taxable in the 
beneficiary’s hands) referred to as ‘taxable income from a discretionary trust’. This addition to 
the gross income definition will require an amendment to the current Act. Although the cost of 
establishing a trust might seem immaterial, other costs associated with the administration of 
trusts and ensuring compliance could have a material effect in deciding whether to make use of 
a discretionary trust or not. The taxpayer will therefore in consultation with his or her tax advisor 
seriously have to consider the costs versus the benefits of the discretionary trusts, should the 
proposals become effective. The taxation proposals and result thereof could ultimately nullify 
other benefits of a discretionary trust, such as the protection of assets and effective wealth 
management of specifically minors or beneficiaries who have no financial planning skills. These 
proposals will have a significant impact on the taxation of trusts and trust beneficiaries 
(Deloitte, 2013:23). If these proposals should become law the beneficiaries will be worse off. 
Against the background of the summary and conclusion above, the following recommendations 
are made with regard to the proposed amendments: 
 To prevent the loss of nature or character of a receipt or accrual with regard to a 
discretionary trust, it is proposed that amounts such as capital receipts and interest, which 
would be adversely affected by the amendments, immediately vest in beneficiaries and 
that this vesting is not conditional based on the exercising of the trustees’ discretion. 
Capital and interest receipts should therefore not be subject to the trustees’ discretion. 
This would circumvent the new proposed amendments, as those amounts would retain their 
nature and character in the hands of the beneficiary; 
 Alternatively, taxpayers should in future no longer make use of discretionary trusts; 
 Assets should be bequeathed directly to heirs (beneficiaries) and not via a trust; 
  National Treasury should scrap the new proposals to ensure and promote equitability; 
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 To deter taxpayers from abusing discretionary trusts with regard to tax avoidance, SARS 
should apply current anti-avoidance rules more efficiently and strictly; 
 The administration of discretionary trusts should be monitored more efficiently by adhering 
to the trust deed, and the intention of the creator of the trust should be clear, 
unambiguous and adhered to. In addition, the exercising of the trustees’ discretion should 
be well and timeously documented in the correct and relevant year of assessment; and 
finally 
 The proposals tabled in Australia should be considered for South African tax purposes. This 
will require an adequate, thorough review process where all options and outcomes are 
considered. 
In conclusion, this article has aimed to clarify the proposed amendments and also indicate the 
potential impact of these proposals. Although at this stage there is no finality with regard to the 
proposed amendments, this article could serve as a potential problem or risk indicator for future 
use. Taxpayers and tax experts alike could use this article as a guideline and additional source 
to take into consideration when deciding whether or not to make use of a discretionary trust in 
South Africa. 
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